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DETERMINATIVE STATUTE(S)/RULE(S) 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-66 (1983), Section 35-1-67 
(1983) and Section 35-1-99 (1981) are the determinative statutes in 
this case. Rule 568-1-9 of the Industrial Commission's 
administrative rules is also applicable. They are set forth in 
full in the Addendum hereto as Exhibit A. 
SUMMARY OF REPLY 
The Petitioner presented credible, unrefuted evidence that he 
sustained a compensable industrial injury in March, 1983, while in 
the employ of Respondent, Beaver Creek Coal Co. The Doctors who 
examined and treated Mr. Denny found that he had sustained an 
industrial injury and that it was responsible, at least in part, 
for his resulting permanent, total disability status. 
The Industrial Commission committed error in concluding that 
Mr. Denny7s claim was barred because he had not filed a claim 
within three years of the date of his accident. Mr. Denny was not 
required to file a claim for compensation with the Industrial 
Commission within three years of the accident because he had 
returned to work - although with difficulty - and had not at that 
point incurred any life-time disability. A statute which would 
allegedly require him to file for benefits within three years is a 
unconstitutional statute of repose and violates the Open Courts 
provision of the Utah Constitution. 
In addition, the Industrial Commission committed error in not 
referring this matter to a Medical Panel for consideration of the 
1 
medical causation issues as required by one of its own industrial 
claim rules. 
This Court should summarily reverse the Industrial 
Commission's determination that Mr. Denny did not establish legal 
or medical causation, and remand with instructions to enter an 
award establishing that fact because of the uncontroverted opinions 
contained in the file. In the alternative, this matter should be 
remanded with instructions to the Industrial Commission to convene 




PETITIONERS 1983 INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT WAS 
LEGALLY AND MEDICALLY THE CAUSE OF HIS 
PERMANENT AND TOTAL DISABILITY. 
Respondents allege that Petitioner failed to meet his burden 
of proving "by a preponderance of the evidence that his disability 
was caused by an industrial accident". (Respondent's Brief at 13). 
It must be stressed that Respondents did not call any witnesses to 
refute the testimony of the Petitioner and his witnesses, did not 
have Mr. Denny examined by their own Doctor, and even joined 
Petitioner in requesting the Industrial Commission refer this 
matter to a Medical Panel! (R. at 94). 
Without any contrary medical evidence of their own, 
Respondents seek to sustain the Industrial Commission decision by 
misconstruing Petitioner's medical records. This is nothing more 
than a transparent attempt to misdirect this Court's attention from 
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the pure legal issues involved by creating the appearance of a 
nonexistent factual dispute. 
As stated in his original Brief, "Mr. Denny does not deny that 
he has pre-existing back injuries." (Petitioner's Brief at 11). 
However, as argued in that Brief, just because a person suffers a 
pre-existing condition, he or she is not disqualified from claiming 
and obtaining workers compensation benefits. "Compensation is not 
dependent on the state of an employee's health or his freedom from 
constitutional weakness or latent tendency." Denver v. Hansen, 650 
P.2d 1319, 1321 (Colo. App. 1982). The clear law of this state is 
that "the aggravation or lighting up of a preexisting disease by an 
industrial accident is compensable...." Powers v. Industrial 
Commission. 427 P.2d 740, 743 (Utah 1967). 
Respondents further attempt to confuse the contribution of Mr. 
Denny's alleged 1987 industrial accident. The record is clear, 
however, that there was no compensable industrial accident in 1987. 
Mr. Denny has admitted that there was no industrial accident in 
1987; the Administrative Law Judge made a specific finding that 
there was no industrial accident in 1987, (R. at 64); and the 
Industrial Commission so found (R. at 113). The references to a 
1987 accident in Petitioner's medical records is, in fact, little 
more than a misunderstanding and a typographical error. Any 
significant reference to that accident in the medical reports is an 
error of reference which would have been eliminated upon review by 
a Medical Panel. 
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A fair review of Dr. Kirkpatrick's medical reports reflect 
that he clearly attributed Mr. Denny's symptoms and disability, at 
least in part, to his 1983 industrial injury. The following are 
ignored by the Respondents and are illuminating: 
(a). In a March 11, 1987 report to Dr. Richard T. Jackson, 
Dr. Kirkpatrick stated as follows: 
The patient says he first developed neck problems about 
12 years ago when a rock fell on his back in a coal mine. 
He had intermittent neck pain that came and went, and 
then 3 years ago he injured his neck again when he got 
caught underneath a belt line. This caused a soreness in 
his neck and arms. The pain would usually come and go 
but then about 6 weeks ago it became more frequent and 
then constant. (R. at 206), 
(b) . In a February 2, 1988, medical report Dr. Kirkpatrick 
reports that Mr. Denny had "No permanent impairment prior to the 
industrial accident." (R. at 217), 
(c) . In a January 30, 1989, medical report to Dr. Morgan, Dr. 
Kirkpatrick stated as follows: "He also had a severe injury 
accident in about 1982 in which his whole spine was hyperflexed." 
(R. at 147); and, 
(d) . In a follow up report to Dr. Morgan dated April 25, 
1989, Dr. Kirkpatrick specifically stated: "His symptoms apparently 
started back in 1982 when he was involved in a severe mining 
accident". (R. at 144). 
Despite the existence of prior back problems, Mr. Denny had no 
impairment prior to his 1983 industrial accident. Dr. Kirkpatrick 
makes it clear that Mr. Denny7s problems started with the 
industrial accident. Any reference to a 1987 accident is in error 
and does not accurately reflect the true cause of Mr. Denny's 
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permanent and total disability status. Dr. Kirkpatrick, after 
determining that Petitioner had a 45% permanent, partial 
impairment, stated that Mr. Denny's total disability "...is at 
least partially related to his industrial accident". (R. at 149). 
The Respondents failed to offer any conflicting medical evidence of 
this fact whatsoever. 
The Industrial Commission simply cannot arbitrarily discount 
competent, uncontradicted evidence indicating that the industrial 
injury was the cause of Petitioner's present permanent, total 
disability. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 709 P.2d 
1168 (Utah 1985). Frito-Lav, Inc. v. Jacobs, 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 
1984). Respondents, recognizing this error, joined with the 
Petitioner on his Motion for Review to the Industrial Commission in 
asking that this matter be referred to a Medical Panel. Any 
confusion over the contribution of a phantom 1987 accident would 
have been removed through the referral to a Medical Panel. This 
error by the Industrial Commission is more completely addressed in 
Point III below. 
Respondents further alleged that Mr. Denny had not marshaled 
the evidence in favor of the Commission's Findings. Although 
Respondents concede that the Findings of the Administrative 
Law Judge were "incorrect and should be disregarded" (R. at 90), 
they allege that "... it is the Commission's findings of fact which 
are on review and the Commission's findings are adequate and 
clearly meet the standards set out in the recent case of Adams v. 
Board of Review. 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991)". (Respondent's 
5. 
Brief at 17-18). Unfortunately, the Commission did not really make 
any findings of it's own and in fact stated "We believe that the 
ALJ did make adequate findings in this case...." (R. at 108). The 
Industrial Commission did not make any new Findings of Fact; 
rather, the vast bulk of their Denial of Motion for Review 
addressed purely legal issues concerning the applicable statute of 
limitations. 
The Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact, to the extent 
that it made any, are simply conclusionary statements without any 
indication as to the Commission's view as to what in fact occurred. 
The actual Findings of Fact portion of the Order in this matter are 
grossly inadequate and do not meet recent legal requirements. Even 
the Respondent Employer and Insurance Carrier joined in arguing 
that the matter should be referred to a Medical Panel, but both the 
Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission refused. 
Such summary conclusions do not constitute proper fact-finding. In 
the recent case of Adams v. Board of Review, supra at 20, this 
Court stated: 
While the purported "Findings of Fact written by the 
A.L.J, contain an informative summary of the evidence 
presented, such a rehearsal of contradictory evidence 
does not constitute findings of fact. In order for a 
finding to truly constitute a "finding of fact," it must 
indicate what the A.L.J, determines in fact occurred.... 
The evidence did not merely indicate two possible 
versions of a fact whereby we could conclude that the 
denial of benefits necessarily indicates that the 
Commission accepted one version over another. The 
evidence shows several possible configurations and 
degrees of injury and/or disease, if any, and the causes, 
if any, thereby creating a matrix of possible factual 
findings. A mere summary of the conflicting evidence in 
this case therefore does not give a clear indication of 
the A.L.J.'s or the Commission's view as to what in fact 
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occurred. Since we cannot even determine why the 
Commission found there was no causation shown, we clearly 
cannot assume that the Commission actually made any of 
the possible subsidiary findings. The findings are 
therefore inadequate. 
The Findings made by the Industrial Commission are deficient 
in that they fail to address in detail the issue of medical 
causation. The absence of a Medical Panel report makes this 
failure even more glaring. 
Although none of the parties, including the Administrative Law 
Judge, dispute that Mr. Denny is permanently and totally disabled, 
the Industrial Commission did not specify the degree to which that 
disability was caused by the 1983 industrial injury. The 
Industrial Commission spends a great deal of time discussing minor 
discrepancies in the medical records, but does not make concise 
findings as to Mr. Denny's current medical condition and the causes 
for it. This failure was undoubtedly compounded by the Industrial 
Commission's unwarranted refusal to submit the matter to a Medical 
Panel, and that failure manifests itself here in inadequate 
Findings. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently informed this 
Commission that: 
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of 
the Commission, the findings must be 'sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose 
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached.' Action v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 
996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 
1336 (Utah 1979))...[T]he failure of an agency to make 
adequate findings of fact on material issues renders its 
findings 'arbitrary and capricious' unless the evidence 
is 'clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one 
conclusion.' Id. (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 
233, 236 (Utah 1983)). Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission, 
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800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 
P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
Once again even the Respondent Employer and Insurance Carrier 
agreed that "The Decision and Order are not truly supported by 
adequate findings based on the entire record". (R. at 90) . Despite 
that remarkable concession, the Industrial Commission continues to 
maintain that the Administrative Law Judge's Findings were 
"adequate". They do not truly enter their own new Findings, but 
rather merely restated the old ones. 
The Industrial Commission's purported Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law should at a minimum be vacated and this matter 
remanded with instructions that a new Order be entered with 
detailed and subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusions were reached. Failure to do so, denies 
Petitioner the ability to marshal the evidence in support of the 
Findings and show that it is not substantial. Grace Drilling Co. 
v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah App. 1989). 
II 
THE THREE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
CONTAINED IN UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 35-
1-99 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE OF REPOSE. 
A. THE THREE YEAR STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY TO CLAIMS FOR 
PERMANENT TOTAL COMPENSATION. 
The Industrial Commission denied Petitioner's claim for 
benefits on the basis that he failed to file a claim within three 
years of the date of his accident, as obstensably required by Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-99 (1981). The primary error in that 
position is that the statute does not apply in cases such as Mr. 
8 
Denny's. The Industrial Commission in its Order Denying Motion for 
Review specifically stated, "There is, however, no bar to medical 
expense claims under this statute, and the issue of permanent total 
compensation remains open.11 (Emphasis added), (R. at 111). Mr. 
Denny, did in fact, file an application for permanent, total 
disability benefits (R. at 1, 11) and it is acknowledged by all of 
the parties, including the Industrial Commission, that Mr. Denny is 
permanently and totally disabled. (R. at 52-53, 144). 
B. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED/ SECTION 35-1-99 AS APPLIED IN THIS 
CASE IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE OP REPOSE. 
In relying on the constitutionality of Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 35-1-99 (1981), Respondents rest entirely upon the 
precedent of Avis v. Board of Review. 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 57 (Utah 
App. 1992). Avis, however, is not applicable to the facts of this 
case. In Avis the Petitioner sought benefits an astonishing 
twenty-two years after the occurrence of his industrial accident. 
This Court found as follows: 
Petitioner knew of his injury on July 4, 1968. He 
received medical treatment for his injury and was aware 
of recurring back pain over a period of several years. 
Therefore, even though petitioner did not seek a 
disability rating or file a compensation claim until 
twenty-two years after his accident, he knew of the 
injury and could have filed for compensation within the 
statutory period. Id. at 59. 
Unlike the Petitioner in Avis who had sought immediate medical 
treatment following his industrial accident, Mr. Denny returned to 
work the next day, only feeling sore. The onset of his symptoms 
began six months later with pain down his left neck, shoulder and 
arm. Even at that time he did not see a doctor, but merely endured 
9 
the pain and continued to work. (R. at 105) . It was not until 
three years latter, in the winter of 1986, that his symptoms became 
severe enough that Mr. Denny finally sought medical treatment and 
was referred to Dr. Kirkpatrick. (R. at 204-205). 
In this case, unlike Avis, the three year statute functions as 
one of repose rather than limitation in that it fails to take 
account of the cumulative and increasing nature of Petitionees 
injuries which ultimately ripened into a valid claim for 
compensation. It is undisputed by the parties that following the 
accident, Mr. Denny continued to work for 4 and one/half years. If 
the holding of Avis is applied with what Professor Larson in his 
treatise on Workers' Compensation calls "medieval literalism", Mr. 
Denny's claim for compensation is now barred because it was not 
filed before it had even matured. This Court has declared such a 
statute as being one of repose and unconstitutional. See Wrolstad 
v. Industrial Commission, 786 P2d 243 (Utah App. 1990), and Velarde 
v. Industrial Commission, 831 P.2d 123 (Utah App. 1992). 
In Wrolstad, supra at 245, this Court acknowledged that "a 
person can't file an occupational disease claim for a disease he 
does not know he has." Likewise, Mr. Denny here could not file his 
claim for permanent, total disability within three years of the 
date of the accident as provided by the statute, because he 
continued to work and did not know that he would be unable to work 
later. It is precisely that fact which in Mr. Denny's case makes 
the statute, in application, one of repose and not limitation. 
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Professor Larson, whose view's on workers compensation matters 
have always been given great weight by this Court, notes the clear 
problems and fundamental unfairness that such a statute of repose 
creates: 
The classic illustration is that of the apparently 
trivial accident that matures into a disabling injury 
after the claim period has expired. A workman is struck 
in the eye by a metal chip, but both he and the company 
doctors dismiss the accident as a petty one, and of 
course no claim is made, since there is no present injury 
or disability* Eighteen months later a cataract develops 
as the direct result of the accident. If the statute 
bars claims filed more than one year after the 
'accident,' and if the court applies the statutory 
language with medieval literalism, the workman can never 
collect for the injury no matter how diligent he is: he 
cannot claim during the year because no compensable 
injury exists; he cannot claim after the year, because 
the statute runs from the accident. 2B Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation Law, Section 78.42(a), page 15-262 (1989). 
* * * 
Limitations periods are of course constitutional in 
general, but is such a period valid when it begins to run 
before a claim exists and assumes to destroy it before it 
is born? Is it not elementary that the running of the 
period must be related to the time of acquisition of the 
enforceable right, rather that of some event which may or 
may not coincide with that acquisition? Suppose a 
statute were passed which said than, in the event of any 
highway collision, suit must be commenced within two 
years of the last presidential election. This is in no 
way any sillier or more oppressive than a statute which 
says that a man who gets a bit of grime in his eye in 
1960 which causes only slight irritation must bring a 
claim for blindness within one year of that time— 
blindness that does not develop until 1962. 2B Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation Law, Section 78.42(e), page 15-
272.5 (1989). 
Mr. Denny is entitled to permanent, total disability 
compensation without regard to the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-99 (1981). It is only in the event that 
his lifetime claim is not accepted, that the statute would apply to 
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a request for temporary total, temporary partial and/or permanent 
partial benefits. Avis is, on its face, distinguishable from the 
facts of this case. To the extent it is applied to Mr. Denny's 
injuries, Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-99 (1981) operates as 
a statute of repose and should be declared unconstitutional in such 
an application. 
Ill 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED ERROR IN NOT 
REFERRING THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL. 
A. RESPONDENTS ARE BARRED ON APPEAL FROM ARGUING AGAINST 
REFERRAL TO A MEDICAL PANEL. 
The Respondent Employer and its insurance carrier in their 
Answer to Applicants Motion for Review, specifically stated that 
"FURTHER, Defendant moves that the matter be referred to a Medical 
Panel to resolve the extent of impairments attributable to valid 
and existing industrial accidents". (R. at 94). Despite this 
request to the Industrial Commission, Respondents now, for the 
first time, allege that referral was not necessary. Respondents 
should not be able to have it both ways, and should be barred from 
abandoning their prior positions by arguing now that the matter 
should not be referred to a Medical Panel. See, LeBaron & 
Associates, v. Rebel Enterprises, 823 P.2d 479 (Utah App. 1991) and 
Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653 (Utah App. 1989). 
B. UTAH ADMINISTRATE CODE, RULE R568-1-9 REQUIRES 
REFERRAL OF THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL. 
Utah Industrial Commission Rule R568-1-9 governing the 
"Necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel" provides in 
relevant part as follows: 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the commission 
adopts the following guidelines in determining the 
necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative 
Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be 
shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent 
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole 
person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the 
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days, 
and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to 
more than $2,000.... See Addendum, Exhibit A. 
Respondents base their argument that referral is not required 
on the grounds that there are "no conflicting reports in this 
case." (Respondent's Brief at 25). There were no conflicting 
medical reports in this case simply because the Respondents chose 
not to present any. They did, however, join in requesting that 
this matter be referred to a Medical Panel. The need for a Medical 
Panel should not be avoided by the Respondent's decision or failure 
not to conduct their own consultative medical examination. 
The Rule mandatorily requires that a panel "will" be used when 
"one or more significant medical issues may be involved". Although 
the Rule further provides that "Generally a significant medical 
issue must be shown by conflicting medical reports", the Rule only 
states that such is the case "generally" and not that such 
conflicting reports are inherently necessary in order for there to 
be "significant medical issues". 
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There can be no genuine dispute that this case involved 
"significant medical issues". The question of the contribution of 
the 1983 industrial injury to Mr, Denny's permanent, total 
disability status is the primary issue in this case. Indeed, in 
this case, the only medical reports available are somewhat 
ambiguous as to the exact causation and some additional confusion 
was created by Dr. Kirkpatrick's referral to the nonexistent 1987 
industrial accident, rather than the actual one in 1983. It is for 
these reasons that referral to a Medical Panel was necessary and 
the failure to do so was more than an abuse of discretion - it was 
plain error. See Lipman v. Industrial Commission, 592 P.2d 616 
(Utah 1979) and Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693 
(Utah 1980) interpreting the former Utah Code Annotated, Section 
35-1-77 (1953) which made referrals to Medical Panels mandatory in 
cases of denied liability. 
C. REFERRAL IN THIS CASE WAS NOT DISCRETIONARY. 
Although the applicable statute makes referral to a 
Medical Panel discretionary, the Industrial Commission Rule 
exercises that discretion by making it mandatory in selected cases, 
i.e., should any of the requirements in subsections (a), (b) or (c) 
of the Rule be met. In response to this argument, Respondents make 
three points: 
1. Legislative Intent. Respondents argue that the Industrial 
Commission cannot adopt a mandatory rule when the legislature 
provided that referral would be discretionary. It is clear that 
given a grant of discretion, an administrative agency can adopt 
rules and regulations governing the application of the discretion. 
Indeed, the failure to do so itself may be an abuse of discretion. 
Were this not so, the Industrial Commission would be constantly 
subject to claims of "abuse of discretion" since it would have no 
standards to guide it in its exercise of discretion. 
There is no conflict between the legislature's grant of 
discretionary authority to the Industrial Commission, and the 
Industrial Commission's adoption of a rule that it will exercise 
that discretion by making referrals mandatory under specific 
circumstances. Such rule-making is a proper utilization of the 
Industrial Commission's discretionary authority granted by the 
Statute. 
2. Exceeding the Scope of Legislative Authority. Respondents 
also argue that the Industrial Commission's Rule, providing for 
mandatory referral in certain circumstances exceeds the scope of 
the discretionary authority granted by statute. They cite no 
authority on point for this position. Respondents are essentially 
remaking the same point addressed above. A regulation which makes 
referral to a Medical Panel mandatory under certain circumstances 
is consistent with the discretionary authority to make those 
referrals granted by the statute. The regulation is not void for 
the mere reason that it specifies the terms and conditions under 
which the grant of discretion will be exercised. 
3. The Administrative Law Judge Can Disregard The Finding of 
the Medical Panel. Mr. Denny does not dispute the fact that the 
Medical Panel report is not conclusive on the issue of medical 
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causation. The Administrative Law Judge, and indeed the Industrial 
Commission itself, may, after viewing the evidence as a whole, 
including the report of the Medical Panel, make the decision that 
other evidence in the case outweighs the findings and conclusions 
of a Medical Panel. Respondent's argument, however, does not at 
all address whether a Medical Panel report should, in the first 
instance, be received and considered. 
The Respondent's argument that administrative agencies' rules 
are mere "guidelines11 which can be disregarded at will has already 
been considered and rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. In State, 
bv and through Department of Community Affairs v. Utah Merit System 
Council. 614 P.2d 1259, the Supreme Court stated as follows: 
The Council cannot violate its own procedure rules.... 
Defendants contend that procedure rules are mere 
'guidelines', but administrative regulations are presumed 
to be reasonable and valid and cannot be ignored or 
followed by the agency to suit its own purpose. Such is 
the essence of arbitrary and capricious action. Without 
compelling reasons for not following its own rules, an 
agency must be held to them, (citations omitted) Id. at 
1263. 
That holding is well grounded and finds authority in virtually 
all jurisdictions. An administrative agency may not violate or 
ignore its own rules, and where it fails to follow the rules which 
it has promulgated, its orders are unlawful. Clay v. Arizona 
Interscholastic Ass'n, Inc., 779 P.2d 349 (Arizona 1989). Tew v. 
City of Topeka Police and Fire Civil Service Commission, 696 P.2d 
1279 (Kansas 1985). State ex rel. Nevada Tax Commission v. Safeway 
Super Service Stations, Inc., 668 P.2d 291 (Nevada 1983). U. S. v. 
RCA Alaska Communications Inc., 597 P.2d 489 (Alaska 1979). 
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Should there be any conflict between a statutory grant of 
authority and an administrative rule, the rule controls where the 
matter at issue is merely "procedural" as distinguished from being 
"substantive." State v. Hawkins. 680 P.2d 522 (Arizona App. 1984). 
Clearly, referral of a workers compensation case to a Medical Panel 
is not a substantive matter but rather a procedural one. As 
Respondents have pointed out, the Medical Panel report is merely 
additional evidence which must be weighed with the record as a 
whole and may be disregarded by the ultimate fact finder, if a 
proper basis exists to do so. In such cases, the administrative 
rule controls over the statutory enactment. 
Although reference to a Medical Panel under Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1982) is discretionary, that discretion 
is not unrestricted and has been made mandatory by the Commissions 
own Rules and Regulations. The failure to refer a matter to a 
Medical Panel, when such referral is requested by all parties and 
is necessary to resolve medical causation issues, is plain error. 
"In some cases, such as where the evidence of causal connection 
between the work-related event and the injury is uncertain or 
highly technical, failure to refer the case to a medical panel may 
be an abuse of discretion." Champion Home Builders v. Industrial 
Commission, 703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985). See also Hone v. J.F. 
Shea Co.. 728 P.2d 1008 (Utah 1986). 
In this case, the causal connection between the work-related 
injury and the Petitionees permanent, total disability, if not 
clear, was at least uncertain and failure to refer the matter to a 
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Medical Panel was error. The Order Denying Motion for Review 
should, at the least, be reversed and the matter remanded with 
directions to refer the matter to a Medical Panel since failure to 
do so was in direct conflict with Industrial Commission practice 
and its own rule. The failure to obtain a Medical Panel report 
resulted in the Industrial Commission lacking the essential and 
necessary information required to properly adjudicate Mr. Denny's 
claim. 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the 
Industrial Commission erred when it entered its August 10, 1992 
Order dismissing Mr. Denny's claim for permanent, total disability 
benefits for lack of legal and medical causation, as well as for 
failure to meet a certain statute of limitations. The 
uncontroverted evidence submitted to the Industrial Commission 
supports the finding that he sustained a significant impairment due 
to his 1983 industrial accident, and is permanently and totally 
disabled - at least in part - as a result of that industrial 
injury. To the extent there is any doubt or confusion as to 
medical causation, it was error for the Industrial Commission not 
to convene a medical panel. 
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this Court remand 
this case to the Industrial Commission with instructions to either 
award Mr. Denny benefits based on the uncontroverted facts and 
medical evidence presented, or in the alternative, to convene a 
Medical Panel. 
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35-1-66. Permanent partial disability — Scale of payments. The commission 
niay make a permanent partial disability award at any time prior to eight years 
after the date of injury to an employee whose physical condition resulting from 
such injury is not finally healed and fixed eight years after the date of injury and 
K'ho files an application for such purpose prior to the expiration of such eight-year 
period. 
In no case shall the weekly payments continue after the disability ends, or the 
death of the injured person. 
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 66 % % of that 
employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a 
maximum of 66 % % of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent 
spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum 
of four such dependent children, but not to exceed 66 %% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week, to be paid weekly for the number 
of weeks stated against such injuries respectively, and shall be in addition to the 
compensation provided for temporary total disability and temporary partial dis-
ability, to wit: 
For the loss of: Number of Weeks 
lA) Upper extremity 
(1) Arm 
(a) Arm and shoulder (forequarter amputation) .218 
(b) Arm at shoulder joint, or above deltoid insertion 187 
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and elbow joint, at elbow joint, or below 
elbow joint proximal to insertion of biceps tendon 178 
(d) Forearm below elbow joint distal to insertion of biceps tendon 168 
(2) Hand 
(a) At wrist or midcarpal or midmetacarpal amputation 168 
(b) All fingers except thumb at metacarpophalangeal joints 101 
(3) Thumb 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of carpometacarpal 
bone 67 
(b) At interphalangeal joint 50 
(4) Index finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone 42 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 34 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 18 
For the loss of: Number of Weekg 
(5) Middle finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone 3. 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint \] 27 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
 l 5 
(6) Ring finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
 1? 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
 l 3 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint ~.
 8 
(7) Little finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone g 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint $ 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 4 
(B) Lower extremity 
(1) Leg 
(a) Hemipelvectomy (leg, hip and pelvis) • 155 
(b) Leg at hip joint or three inches or less below tuberosity of ischium 
;••; .>»•»..»....;.... 125 
(c) Leg above knee with functional stump, at knee joint or Gritti-Stokes 
amputation or below knee with short stump (three inches or less 
below intercondylar notch) 112 
(d) Leg below knee with functional stump 88 
(2) Foot 
(a) Foot at ankle 88 
(b) Foot partial amputation (Chopart's) 66 
(c) Foot midmetatarsal amputation 44 
R Y H T R T T A 
(3) Toes 
(a) Great toe 
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone 26 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint \§ 
(iii) At interphalangeal joint 12 
(b) Lesser toe (2nd — 5th) 
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone 4 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint 3 
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal joint 2 
(iv) At distal interphalangeal joint 1 
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal joints 26 
(4) Miscellaneous 
(a) One eye by enucleation 120 
(b) Total blindness of one eye 100 
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing 100 
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed equivalent to loss of 
the member. Partial loss or partial loss of use shall be a percentage of the complete 
loss or loss of use of the member. This paragraph, however, shall not apply to the 
items listed (B) (4). 
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall be determined and paid as fol-
lows: 
"Loss of hearing" is defined as the binaural hearing loss measured in decibels 
with frequencies of 500,1000x ftfld 20002 and 3000 cycles per second (cps) using pure 
tone air conduction audiometric instruments (ASA 1951) (ANSI 1969) approved by 
nationally recognized authorities in the field of measurement of hearing impair-
ment. Reduction of hearing ability in frequencies above 2000 3000 cycles per second 
shall not be considered in determining compensable disability. If the average deci-
bel loss at 500^  1000, 2000, and 3000 cycles per second ]s 25 deciEelTor less, usually 
no hearing impairment exists. 
"Presbycusis" is defined as hearing loss common to persons of advanced age and 
s considered to be due to general environment rather than industrial conditions. 
In measuring hearing loss, a medical panel of medical and paramedical profes-
aefts professionals appointed by the commission shall measure the loss in each ear 
it the three four frequencies 500, 10002 ftftd 2000£ and 3000 cycles per second which 
shall be added together and divided by three four to determine the average decibel 
oss. 5^ allow ler presbycusis, there shall be deducted from the average decibel 
•ess -Vt ft decibel fer eaeh year ef the employee's age over forty at -the -feme of-the 
accident: To determine the percentage of hearing loss in each ear, (after deduction 
rf the less m decibels ler presbycusis) the average decibel loss for each decibel 
}f loss exceeding fifteen 25 decibels shall be multiplied by \xk% up to the maxi-
mum of 100% which is reached at 82 92 decibels. 
Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying the percentage of hearing loss 
in the better ear by five, then adding the percentage of hearing loss in the poorer 
ear and dividing by six. The resulting figure is the percentage of binaural hearing 
loss. Compensation for permanent partial disability for binaural hearing loss shall 
be determined by multiplying the percentage of binaural hearing loss by 100 weeks 
of compensation benefits as provided in this chapter. Where an employee files one 
or more claims for hearing loss the percentage of hearing loss previously found 
to exist shall be deducted from any subsequent award by the commission. In no 
event shall compensation benefits be paid for total or 100% binaural hearing loss 
exceeding 100 weeks of compensation benefits. 
For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily function not otherwise provided 
for herein, such period of compensation as the commission' shall deem equitable 
and in proportion as near as may be to compensation for specific loss as set forth 
in the schedule in this section but not exceeding in any case 312 weeks, which shall 
be considered the period of compensation for permanent total losp of bodily func-
tion. 
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations as to the 
maximum weekly amount payable as specified in this section, and in no event shall 
more than a maximum of 66%% of the state average weekly wage at the time 
of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be required to be paid. 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments — Vocation*! 
rehabilitation — Procedure and payments. In cases of permanent total disability 
the employee shall receive 66 % % of his average weekly wages at the time of the 
injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage 
at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week 
plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the 
age of eighteen 18 years, up to a maximum of four sueh dependent minor children 
not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury 
but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week. However, in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or 
its insurance carrier be required to pay s«eh weekly compensation payments for 
more than 312 weekst a«d provided further, that a. A finding by the commission 
of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final until such 
time as the following proceedings have been had: Where If the employee has tenta-
tively been found to be permanently and totally disabled, it shall be mandatory 
that the industrial commission of Utah refer sueh the employee to the division of 
vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education for rehabilitation 
training and it shall be the duty of the commission to order paid to stteh the voca-
tional rehabilitation division, out of the second injury fund provided for by occtie» 
subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training 
of st*eh the employee; the rehabilitation and training of stieh the employee shall 
generally follow the practice applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the 
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If and when the division of 
vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education certifies to the indus-
trial commission of Utah a«4 in writing that mtb the employee has fully 
co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to rehabili-
tate him, and in the opinion of the division the employee may not be rehabilitated, 
then the commission shall order that there be paid to sueh the employee weekly 
benefits at the rate of 66 % % of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, 
but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the 
time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus 
$5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age 
of eighteen 18 years, up to a maximum of four stieh dependent minor children not 
to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but 
lot to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the tfime of the injury per 
veek out of the second injury fund provided for by section subsection 35-1-68 (1), 
%or such period of time beginning with the time that the paymentSj fas in this sec-
;ion provided)2 to be made by the employer or its insurance carrier terminate and 
ending with the death of the employee. No employee; however, shall be entitled 
:o any such benefits if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the division of voca-
tional rehabilitation as set forth herein under this section. 
All persons who are permanently and totally disabled and entitled to benefits 
from the second injury fund designated m subsection (i) of section 85-1-68 under 
subsection 35-1-68 (1), including those injured prior to March 6, 1949, shall receive 
not less than $±Q0 $110 per week when paid only by the second injury fund, or 
when combined with compensation payments of the employer or the insurance car-
rier. The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the voca-
tional training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the 
work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon the commission shall, 
after notice to the employer and an opportunity to be heard, determine whether 
she employee has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily 
function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both arms, or 
both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shaW constitute consti-
tutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to the provisions 
of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total disability shaM be is 
required in streh those instances; m. In all other cases; however, a«d where there 
has been rehabilitation effected but where there is some loss of bodily function, 
the award shall be based upon partial permanent disability. 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay compen-
sation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in sections 
35-1-65, 35 1-66 and this section, including loss of function, in excess of 85% of 
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week for 312 weeks. 
35-1-77. Medical panel — Discretionary authority of commission to refer 
case — Findings and reports — Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses. 
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or for death, 
arising out of or in the course of employment, and where the employer or insurance 
carrier denies liability, the commission may refer the medical aspects of the case 
to a medical panel appointed by the commission and having the qualifications gen-
erally applicable to the medical panel set forth in section 35-2-56. The medical 
panel shall then make such study, take such X-rays and perform such tests, includ-
ing post-mortem examinations where authorized by the commission, as it may 
determine and thereafter make a report in writing to the commission in a form 
prescribed by the commission, and also make such additional findings as the com-
mission may require. The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the 
report of the panel to the applicant, the employer and the insurance carrier by 
registered mail with return receipt requested. Within fifteen days after such report 
is deposited in the United States post office, the applicant, the employer or the 
insurance carrier may file with the commission objections in writing thereto. If 
no objections are so filed within such period, the report shall be deemed admitted 
in evidence and the commission may base its finding and decision on the report 
of the panel, but shall not be bound by such report if there is other substantial 
conflicting evidence in the case which supports a contrary finding by the commis-
sion. If objections to such report are filed the commission may set the case for 
hearing to determine the facts and issues involved, and at such hearing any party 
so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman of the medical panel 
present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good cause 
shown the commission may order other members of the panel, with or without the 
chairman, to be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. 
Upon such hearing the written report of the panel may be received as an exhibit 
but shall not be considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained 
by the testimony admitted. The expenses of such study and report by the medical 
panel and of their appearance before the commission shall be paid out of the fund 
provided for by section 35-1-68. 
35-1-^9. Notice of injury and claim for compensation — Limitation of 
action — Tolling period for filing claim. When an employee claiming to have 
suffered an injury in the service of his employer fails to give notice to his employer 
0f the time and place where the accident and injury occurred, and of the nature 
of the same, within 48 hours, when possible, or fails to report for medical treatment 
within said time, the compensation provided for herein shall be reduced 15%; pro-
vided, that knowledge of such injury obtained from any source on the part of such 
employer, his managing agent, superintendent, foreman or other person in author-
ity, or knowledge of any assertion by the injured sufficient to afford an opportunity 
to the employer to make an investigation into the facts and to provide medical 
treatment shall be equivalent to such notice; and no defect or inaccuracy therein 
shall subject the claimant to such reduction, if there was no intention to mislead 
or prejudice the employer in making his defense, and the employer was not, in fact, 
so misled or prejudiced thereby. If no notice of the accident and injury is given 
to the employer within one year from the date of the accident, the right to compen-
sation shall be wholly barred. If no claim for compensation is filed with the indus-
trial commission within three years from the date of the accident or the date of 
the last payment of compensation, the right to compensation shall be wholly 
barred; provided, however, that the filing of a report or notice of accident or injury 
with the industrial commission, the employer or its insurance carrier, together with 
the payment of any compensation benefit or the furnishing of medical treatment 
by the employer or an insurance carrier, shall toll the period for filing such claim 
until the employer or its carrier notifies the industrial commission and employee, 
in writing, of its denial of liability or further liability, as the case may be, for 
the industrial accident or injury, with instructions upon said notification of denial 
to the employee to contact the industrial commission for further advice or assist-
ance to preserve or protect the employee's rights; and provided further, that the 
said claim for compensation in any event must be filed within 8 years from the 
date of the accident. 
R568-1-9 Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel, 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the commission adopts the 
following guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a 
case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative 
Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be 
shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent 
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the 
whole person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the 
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 
days, and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting 
to more than $2,000. 
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be 
scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical 
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel report. 
Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting medical 
evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a 
hearing, re-submit the new evidence to the panel for 
consideration and clarification. 
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured 
worker to be examined by another physician for the purpose of 
obtaining a further medical examination or evaluation 
pertaining to the medical issues involved, and to obtain a 
report addressing these medical issues in all cases where: 
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to 
give an impairment rating, 
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be 
non-industrial, and/or 
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such 
further evaluation. 
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical 
panel or medical consultant and of their appearance at the 
hearing, as well as any expenses for further medical 
examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative 
Law Judge, shall be paid out of the Employers7 Reinsurance 
Fund. 
